Esboço de uma teoria semântica da informação

Neste artigo, Bar-Hillel e Carnap apresentam pela primeira vez as ideias básicas de uma teoria da informação semântica. O conceito de informação, baseado em sentença declarativa em uma dada linguagem, é definido pelo conteúdo descritivo expresso pelas sentenças. A quantidade de informação é calculada com base em um conjunto de funções lógicas probabilísticas sobre conjuntos de conteúdos descritíveis. Esta teoria tem aplicabilidade dedutiva e indutiva, significando um marco para o desenvolvimento das teorias filosóficas da informação

Наукове свiторозумiння — Вiденський гурток

Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath. Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis. Wien: Artur Wolf Verlag, 1929. Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath. Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis. Wien: Artur Wolf Verlag, 1929

Comptes rendus sur Dingler, Physik und Hypothese (1921)

Cette section contient les recensions que Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schlick et Hermann Weyl ont données de l’ouvrage de Hugo Dingler : Physik und Hypothese. Versuch einer induktiven Wissenschaftslehre nebst einer kris­tischen Analyse der Fundamente der Relativitätstheorie [Dingler 1921]. Elles sont traduites par Christophe Bouriau en collaboration avec Oliver Sehlaudt et Gerhard Heinzmann.In this section one finds reviews of Hugo Dingler’s Physik und Hypothese, Versuch einer induktiven Wissenschaftslehre nebst einer kristi­schen Analyse der Fundamente der Relativitätstheorie [Dingler 1921], transla­ted by Christophe Bouriau in collaboration with Oliver Sehlaudt and Gerhard Heinzmann

The History and Prehistory of Natural-Language Semantics

Contemporary natural-language semantics began with the assumption that the meaning of a sentence could be modeled by a single truth condition, or by an entity with a truth-condition. But with the recent explosion of dynamic semantics and pragmatics and of work on non- truth-conditional dimensions of linguistic meaning, we are now in the midst of a shift away from a truth-condition-centric view and toward the idea that a sentence’s meaning must be spelled out in terms of its various roles in conversation. This communicative turn in semantics raises historical questions: Why was truth-conditional semantics dominant in the first place, and why were the phenomena now driving the communicative turn initially ignored or misunderstood by truth-conditional semanticists? I offer a historical answer to both questions. The history of natural-language semantics—springing from the work of Donald Davidson and Richard Montague—began with a methodological toolkit that Frege, Tarski, Carnap, and others had created to better understand artificial languages. For them, the study of linguistic meaning was subservient to other explanatory goals in logic, philosophy, and the foundations of mathematics, and this subservience was reflected in the fact that they idealized away from all aspects of meaning that get in the way of a one-to-one correspondence between sentences and truth-conditions. The truth-conditional beginnings of natural- language semantics are best explained by the fact that, upon turning their attention to the empirical study of natural language, Davidson and Montague adopted the methodological toolkit assembled by Frege, Tarski, and Carnap and, along with it, their idealization away from non-truth-conditional semantic phenomena. But this pivot in explana- tory priorities toward natural language itself rendered the adoption of the truth-conditional idealization inappropriate. Lifting the truth-conditional idealization has forced semanticists to upend the conception of linguistic meaning that was originally embodied in their methodology